

## Reading as a Spiritual Discipline

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"Christiano philosopho lectio exhortatio debet esse, non occupatio, et bona desideria pascere, non necare"[1]

### Reading and the theological school

Suppose we understand a theological school as John Webster does: "A theological school is a place where Scripture and the classics of theological response to Scripture are read in common to the end of the formation of Christian intellectual habits." [2]. This is reasonable and straightforward, especially in the view, clarified and defended in the rest of the essay from which the quotation is taken, that reading of this sort is primary or basic for theological education: without such reading no theological formation can occur, and with it all things are possible [3]. This is not to say that only "Scripture and the classics of theological response to it" ought to be read in theological schools; but it is to say that any other reading done in such places ought to be subservient to and framed by that sort of reading, and that reading Scripture and the classics of theological response to it is the kind of activity whose presence and centrality marks off a theological school from other kinds of school.

To say that a theological school is a place defined by reading ought immediately to raise the question of what it is to read. But this question doesn't naturally occur to those teaching and learning in theological schools at the beginning of the third millennium. This is because those of us in such settings, professionally literate as we are, think we know both what reading is and how to do it. But these thoughts are mistaken: most of us have little or no idea of what reading is, have never given its history much thought, and do not teach or learn in institutions where instruction in it has a place.

'Reading' has come, in late-capitalist democracies at the end of the twentieth century, to denote a particular technical skill: the skill of interpreting written language, of making sound and meaning from scratch marks or squiggles on paper. This is what we learned at school; this is what is endlessly and mechanically tested (in SAT, ACT, ESL, GRE, LSAT, GMAT, MCAT, and so endlessly and acronymically on through the products of the educational-testing bureaucracy) by assessing the fledgling reader's ability to extract information from passages of prose. This skill is essentially a technique with a single modality, though many gradations. In this it is like, say, running: in both cases, the gradations have to do with speed (or, better, dispatch). Once you have learned the basic techniques used for decoding the squiggles of written language (the alphabet or the ideographs, the fundamental rules of grammar and syntax, a working vocabulary), all that remains if you want to improve is to perform the semi-magical feat of extracting meaning from squiggles with more dispatch and less hesitation. And, moreover, your effectiveness as a reader tends to be measured precisely in terms of the speed with which you can perform. Similarly, once you have learned the basic physical techniques required for running, all that remains is to learn to run faster, and the faster you can run the better runner you are.

Teachers in theological schools are professionally literate: our livelihood depends in part upon our firm possession of the skill described in the preceding paragraph. Our

students, too, are usually approximately literate in this sense. This is why we (and they) think we know what reading is and how to do it. We think we know these things because we have assimilated and reduced reading to literacy, and we know perfectly well what the latter is-or at least we know it well enough not to think it necessary to give theoretical thought to it, much less to teach it or to advocate its teaching as a central element in the theological formation that is the job of a theological school. But 'reading' need not mean 'literacy'. *Lectio*, for instance, as understood in the Latin-writing west, certainly did not mean this: when Augustine heard the words "tolle, lege" what he understood by the command to read may have required literacy (though I doubt it), but certainly wasn't reducible to it. When Christians from Augustine to Calvin and beyond have advocated close and repeated scriptural reading as an essential part of the Christian life they have typically not thought that they were advocating the application of the skills of literacy to the written text of Scripture. George Herbert, for instance, wrote of Scripture: "Oh Book! infinite sweetness! let my heart/Suck ev'ry letter and a hony gain." [4] but you can suck perfectly well without being literate (perhaps all the better for not being literate). So why have we come to identify reading with literacy?

Briefly, and much too superficially, the chief reasons why this identification has become standard are economic and political. Since the eighteenth century, economists and intellectual historians have thought that there are close conceptual and causal connections between the possession of a medium of economic exchange (usually coinage) which permits large-scale and translocal trade, and the possession of a medium of intellectual exchange (usually letters, *litterae*, whence literacy) which permits large scale and translocal intellectual commerce. Gibbon, for example, says that "both these institutions," (he means coinage and alphabets) "by giving a more active energy to the powers and passions of human nature, have contributed to multiply the objects they were designed to represent." [5] He also suggests that those polities in possession of the one have usually come to possess the other, and that civilization is found wherever both are present, while in the absence of one or the other we find only a "herd of savages incapable of knowledge or reflection." [6] Gibbon's rhetoric isn't one I would choose, and I don't know whether he's right about the conceptual and causal connections; but that he thought there were such connections and that many of his successors have repeated the idea are matters of import for understanding how we, teachers and students of theology at the end of the second millennium, think about literacy and reading.

One result is that theorists have typically homologized their thought about the economic and political order with their thought about the intellectual and spiritual order: the same tropes crop up on both sides of the divide, and they enter deeply into the culture at all levels. This means (painting now with a very broad brush) that as mass production became possible by way of technological innovation, and speculative investment became possible by way (principally) of the invention of that quasi-person, the limited-liability corporation, thought about reading became dominated by tropes of mass production, speed of throughput, and return on investment: *lectio* devolved into literacy. It is not accidental in this connection that the aspiration to universal adult literacy is strongest precisely in those states most committed to (and furthest along the path of) late-capitalist democracy.

It's important to be aware how recent that aspiration is (no nation gave clear voice to it until the nineteenth century), and how odd it would have seemed in (say) thirteenth-

century Europe, or even in the nascent nation states of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Even now, no state has achieved it, even if it is construed moderately as basic reading literacy in one language. The Scandinavian countries probably came closest in the mid-twentieth century, but there, as everywhere, literacy rates are now declining. The United States has never been remotely close to achieving universal adult literacy. It is very probable that as the forms of economic life that gave sense to the aspiration for universal adult literacy pass away, the aspiration will also cease to be lively. Christians ought not to worry very much about this.

Furthermore, this history is not inevitable. We need not be entirely subject to it in our thinking about theological formation, which is to say that we do not need to think that when John Webster speaks of reading Scripture and the classics of theological response to it, he is really speaking of the application of the skill of literacy to these materials. We can, instead, begin to think as Christians about what it means to read; and if we do, we begin to find that there is a rich tradition of thought and practice to draw upon, a tradition that calls into question both the reduction of reading to literacy and the metaphors of the market by which that reduction is almost always informed. If we do begin to rethink our attitudes to reading in this way, we will be turning our attention to the Christian past as though it might have something to teach us about what intellectual work is and how best to do it, and thus also about how best to form in our students and ourselves the habits proper to such work. And this is a procedure that we, those engaged in theological formation, ought generally to follow when thinking about what such formation is and how best to nurture it and encourage its development. This is because we have a vocation to form Christian intellectual habits in our students (or at least to be of some causal significance in such formation, a qualification made necessary by the fact that the principal agent in theological formation is always God), and to be thoughtlessly subject to orthodoxies and orthopraxies on the matter of learning and teaching that have nothing to do with Christianity is unlikely to help us in fulfilling that vocation. Resisting such orthodoxies and orthopraxies is best achieved by making Christian thought and practice about these matters our point of first theoretical and practical refuge.

A full corrective would require a thorough study of the Christian theory and practice of reading and a set of recommendations on the basis of such a study as to how best to teach and practice reading in theological schools. I can't offer all that here; what I shall do instead is present impressionistic sketches of three ways of understanding and practicing reading, vignettes of what it would be like to teach and practice reading as, first, an academic; second, a Proustian; and third, a Victorine. The aim of these vignettes is not exhaustiveness (there are other modes of reading, and those I sketch will have to be treated very summarily); it is only to show that there is no single way to read, and to point the question of choice among the possibilities by doing so.

### Academic Reading

This mode of reading has been adumbrated in what I've said to this point. It's the standard mode of reading for us all, the mode in which you, the reader of the book in which this essay appears, are almost certainly now reading. Technical mastery and consumption-for-use are its governing tropes. Max Weber will be my main representative of this position, especially in what he says about the academic life in his 1918 lecture "Wissenschaft als Beruf" (Science as Vocation). [7]

Ideal academic readers about to read will have prepared themselves as technicians. They will have mastered the necessary linguistic skills to read what it is they want to read (Latin for Aquinas, Greek for Chrysostom, Sanskrit for Vasubandhu, and so on). They will, again ideally, have read everything the author they're reading had read, and, indeed, everything of any possible relevance to the understanding of their chosen work. This will be a minimal preparation (bear in mind that I write of ideal academic readers here; actual ones rarely manage anything approaching this). Fuller preparation will depend upon decisions as to just what is hoped for from the act of reading: different purposes will require mastery of different skills and bodies of knowledge. If, for example, you read a body of manuscripts with the goal of establishing a critically-edited text, you'll need to have different skills and different kinds of knowledge than you would were you to read a printed edition with the goal of understanding its rhetoric, conceptual structure, or use of imagery. In general, academic readers prepare themselves as technicians with the skills needed to prosecute whatever task they have in mind.

Academic readers typically show a deep concern with reading just what the author of whatever they're reading wrote. They want the *ipsissima verba* set down in a bounded and fixed text, an authoritative object to be mastered and used. The ideal type, perhaps, is the printed edition with full apparatus criticus. The academic reader applies the skills of literacy to this object, and does so in solitude and silence. The eye, trained to the skill of sucking up lines and paragraphs of print, delivers its visual input to the brain, where meaning is made. The object read, the printed text, remains always before the reader; its reassuring continued presence means that reading can be rapid, for the text is there to be consulted again should anything be forgotten or misconstrued. The printed text, designed as it is for easy and repeated reference, lies passively on the desk as a permanent possibility of rereading. The reader-technician flicks the pages back and forth to find in it what will serve her purposes as she reads and refers, using her technical tools to find what she needs. She values, above all else, speed and clarity about the purposes of her reading.

This mode of reading establishes a certain kind of relation between reader and text read. It is, above all, a relation in which the reader is the agent and the text the patient; the text lies supine before the reader, awaiting the exercise of intention and desire that only the reader can bring. The application of technical skill to an object is always like this; it is an instrument in the service of an end other than itself, an action that occurs principally within the sphere of technique and its derivative, technology. When the right technique has been used for the purpose at hand, the act of reading is exhausted and the object read irrelevant; the book, at that point, is put back on the shelf. There is no moral relation between book and reader for the academic reader; anything at all can be done with the book that serves the reader's purposes. What the work being read claims, its topic and goals, bear no intrinsic relation to what academic readers do and the purposes for which they do it: the academic reader (in his ideal type, at least) can as happily read a work on the methods of making papyrus rolls from the reed *Cyperus papyrus* as one on how best to love God, and remain equally unaffected, morally, by each.

What, then, are the purposes of the academic reader? Max Weber is helpful here, providing as he does an understanding of such a reader's vocation that is subtle and nuanced. Fundamental to his argument, and to the family of views it represents, is the attempt systematically to separate fact from value, and to identify the former with what

can be arrived at by empirical procedures. Dealing with facts as an analytical thinker is what characterizes the work of the academic reader, the reader in search of *Wissenschaft*. [8]

Such readers engage in specialized intellectual work: they focus on a tightly-defined question within a delimited field. Specialization is necessary because mastery is the goal: academic readers ought to know everything that is relevant to their question. Imagery of mastery and domination is threaded throughout Weber's essay. Academic readers work in a disenchanted world, a world in which there are no occult or mysterious forces, or at least none of relevance to the work of the academic reader. What there is in the world, for academic readers is just and only what can be mastered and understood by technical means: "Technical means and calculations perform the service. This above all is what intellectualization means," as Weber says. [9] This is reading whose principal tools are the concept deployed in coercive argument and the repeatable experiment. Academic readers should want to demonstrate by argument and prove by experiment (Weber of course acknowledges the differences between what 'experiment' might mean in physics and what it might mean in history, but thinks nonetheless that there is sufficient commonality between the two to make it reasonable to use the same term). They are committed to explanation and analysis using only what is derivable from broadly empirical methods, which means at least that academic readers can appeal to no supernatural factors while they're acting as such (this means at least that an intellectual cannot appeal to the agency of God while doing intellectual work). Finally, the academic reader's quest for *Wissenschaft* is an activity intimately linked to the idea of progress: academic readers know that the results at which they arrive will be superseded, just as these results superseded earlier ones.

Academic reading is, then, not aimed at and does not lead to God, or true art, or effective happiness, or moral transformation. It does not provide answers to questions of value (in, e.g., aesthetics, medicine, jurisprudence, religion); it answers only questions of fact. Academic readers must never adopt a position on questions of value, at least not while practicing their craft. Adopting a position in the academic lecture hall or in the pages of an academic book on such questions is to abandon the work of the academic reader; this is a strong theme in Weber's essay.

The positive benefits of academic reading as presented by Weber are, first, that it can teach students to recognize and deal with facts inconvenient for their party position. Weber takes this to be a moral benefit. Second, the practice of such reading aids technology, which Weber understands to be the means of controlling and ordering things; it does this principally by fostering habits of thought that make the development and use of technology possible. Third, it aims at (and sometimes achieves) clarity in seeing the assumptions and implications of any position-but most especially on questions of value. It will show those who do take positions on questions of value (on, say, the desirability of worshipping God or advocating democracy) what they are assuming by taking such a position. This is the "final service that science as such can render to the aim of clarity." [10]

So much for academic reading. You, the reader of this essay, almost certainly know from inside what this mode of reading is like. If you possess a graduate degree or are working toward one, it's just what you'll have learned or be learning to do, and this is true whether or not you have studied in a theological school. But it is not the only way to

read a book. I turn now to another possibility, that of the Proustian reader.

### Proustian Reading

For my sketch of this mode of reading, I'll draw principally upon Marcel Proust's essay "Sur la lecture" (On Reading), composed between 1900 and 1905 to serve as preface to a French version (partly made by Proust) of John Ruskin's *Sesame and Lilies*. [11]

Proustian readers read in order to be incited to reverie, to be pushed by the catalyst of reading into the internal depths of memory and aesthetic sensibility. Reading is productive of sensual, aesthetic, and (often) properly sexual pleasure, as Proust says it is "a pleasure at once ardent and restful (*jouissance à la fois ardente et rassise*) ... during it, a thousand poetical sensations and a thousand sensations of undifferentiated wellbeing well rapidly up from the depths of our good health to interfuse the reader's reverie with a pleasure as sweet and golden as honey." [12] Reading is like lovemaking. Lovers are ardent and restful; the pleasures they get from the caresses and play of love, from *jouissance*, are intense and manifold, but typically not precisely differentiated or demarcated. [13] The pleasurable reveries of foreplay and of postorgasmic ease are, for them, as sweet as honey, as golden as sunlight refracted through stained glass (both favorite Proustian images). [14]

But the book read, for the Proustian reader, unlike the lover, is not an active partner in the reader's *jouissance*, matching kiss for kiss and caress for caress; it is, instead, a catalyst for the reader's solitary pleasures, an instrument that draws pleasures from within the reader, and that exhausts its function when these pleasures have been catalyzed into being. This means that Proustian readers are not much interested in the content of what they read. They are more concerned with the inner work it prompts them to do. Proust makes this point most strikingly when he speaks of childhood reading; when he recalls this, he does not think of what was in the books he read, but rather of the inner life of the child who read them. It is important to the Proustian reader to separate the act of reading and the work it catalyzes from the content of what is read; the latter is unimportant; the former all-important. Reading, on this view, is an element in the reader's continuing work of self-creation: it evokes memory, decorates the mottled screen of the reader's mind with increasing density and complexity, and permits the pointed refinement of the reader's aesthetic sensibility.

What Proustian readers most want to read, then (and here the contrast with the academic reader's desire for the bounded text and the *ipsissima verba* is very striking), are books whose elegance of style and subtlety of aesthetic insight can intoxicate them into developing feelings and aesthetic insights that go beyond what is in the books. "It is," says Proust, "at the moment when they [books] have said to us all they can say that they bring to birth in us a feeling of which they have yet said nothing (*le sentiment qu'ils ne nous encore rien dit*)." [15]

This view of the benefits of reading leads Proustian readers also to be aware of its limitations. It can be a curative discipline for those whose weakness of will prevents them from developing the habits of perception that permit penetration beneath the surface of things to the profound inner regions of the self; it can, that is, be a useful exterior stimulus. But it can never be more than that. Proust mentions with approval Emerson's habit of reading a few pages of Plato each day before beginning his own work, and

Dante's of doing the same with Virgil. [16] But reading of this sort is done without deep interest in what Plato or Virgil say; it is done, instead, as the apprentice dancer might watch the expert's pirouettes, with the goal of absorbing (and in absorbing, transforming) the technique of the expert. Emerson and Dante, on this view, did not make the mistake of thinking that their reading could give them access to truth in the form of "a material thing deposited between the pages of books, like honey entirely prepared by others." [17] They knew, as all good Proustian readers know, that the real work of reading has nothing to do with what's on the page read. Reading is a preparation for no longer needing to read, a preliminary training to be abandoned when the sensibilities of the reader are sufficiently finely tuned. Proust says:

Original minds are able to subordinate reading to their own personal activity. For them, it is no more than the most noble of distractions, and certainly the most ennobling, because only reading and knowledge are able to make a well-mannered mind (seuls, la lecture et le savoir donnent les «belles manières» de l'esprit). We can develop our sensibility and intelligence only inside ourselves, in the depths of our spiritual lives (dans les profondeurs de notre vie spirituelle); but our minds are fashioned by reading, which is contact with other minds. [18]

Again, the person in charge is the reader; what is read is an important (but finally contingent) tool for self-development.

Proustian readers, then, understand reading as an instrument in the service of a goal other than itself; in this they are like academic readers, but the goal, of course, is different. What Proustians want to read also differs from what academic readers want to read; the former want anything that intimates or evokes a more profound and finely-tuned aesthetic sensibility; they show no interest whatever in *ipsisissima verba* or critical editions, in the scientific questions of the Weberian intellectual, or, indeed, in remembering or placing any intrinsic value upon what they read. Proustians want to be ravished by their reading; Weberians want technical mastery of a discipline from theirs. For both, though, the reader is the one in charge and the text, the thing read, the servant of the reader. Relations of dominance are one way.

### Victorine Reading

For a sketch of this third mode, I draw mostly upon Hugh of St. Victor's analysis of reading in his work *Didascalicon: De studio legendi* (A Handbook of Learning: On the Pursuit of Reading), composed in Latin at the Abbey of St. Victor in Paris sometime in the 1120s. [19]

Victorine readers begin by locating the work they're planning to read. There are two fundamental possibilities: one is that the work belongs to the arts (*artes*); the other is that it belongs to the "writings that should be called divine" (*scripturae divinae appellandae sint*) [20], which is to say to the canon of Scripture. Every work belongs to one of these two categories, and none belongs to both. Since, for Victorines, scriptural works have deeply different properties from all others, different methods of reading will be appropriate for works in each group, and this is why it is important to know, before you begin reading, where the work you're planning to read belongs. Hugh of St. Victor

has this to say about the difference between the two groups:

The writings of the philosophers (*philosophorum scripturae*) are like white-painted walls of clay (*quasi luteus paries dealbatus*): they have a surface radiance of eloquence. While they present the appearance of truth, they do so by mixing it with falsehood, concealing, as it were, the clay of error with an overlay of color. By contrast, divine eloquence (*divina eloquia*) is best likened to a honeycomb (*favus*): while it seems dry because of the simplicity of its language, it is in fact full of sweetness inside. It alone is found to be free from the infection of falsehood. [21]

Victorines do not, however, think that nonscriptural works are to be ignored. That they always contain error means that they have to be read carefully, but not that they should be left alone. Intellectual and spiritual benefit can be had from these whited sepulchers. But how to get it? There is an ordered program here. Victorines begin their reading of nonscriptural works by analyzing them grammatically, syntactically, and semantically; this, of course, requires deployment of the appropriate linguistic skills, as was also true for the academic reader. The next step is to study, analytically, the central topic of the work read, and of the order of thought proper to its understanding and exposition. Here too we are on much the same ground as the academic reader (and in a very different place from the Proustian reader). Next, the memory must be used to order and compile (*colligere* is the favorite verb here) extracts that illustrate the analytical outline made in the second stage; these extracts are to be memorized verbatim and stored in the “treasure-chest of the memory” (*arcula memoriae*), from where they can later be ruminated at leisure. And, finally, in connection with this chewing-over of memorized extracts in the context of an ordered (and also memorized) analytical outline of the work read, the Victorine reader engages in deeper analytical thought about the implications of the work read.

Even in the case of nonscriptural works Victorine readers are concerned to establish a moral as well as a memorial relation with what they read. The emphasis upon storage in the memory already suggests this; but it becomes abundantly clear when Hugh emphasizes the need for humility before what is read, and for an eagerness to read and learn that permits sacrifice of ease and luxury on the part of the reader. [22] The reader’s mind becomes conformed to what she reads as a result of this assumption of humility before the work read; and this means in turn that, for Victorines, even the reading of nonscriptural works is an instrument that contributes to the reader’s wisdom and that permits advance toward divine wisdom. [23]

For Victorines, all nonscriptural reading is framed by and ordered to scriptural reading. But scriptural reading, like nonscriptural, may be done well or badly, and Hugh emphasizes this by providing a division of those who read Scripture into three kinds. [24] There are those who seek knowledge through such reading for fame and honor--Hugh would likely place most academic readers into this category, and he says that such readers are to be pitied; there are those who read for aesthetic delight (the Proustians, perhaps)--these, says Hugh, have praiseworthy but insufficient motives; and then there are those who read because they want to understand better the hidden things of God (*secreta Dei*)-and these are the ones whose motives are in order. For them, all the

methods used for reading nonscriptural works ought be used (grammatical and syntactical analysis, systematic outlining, memorial storage), but these must then be supplemented by attention to (and repeated reading in light of) the various levels of meaning possessed by Scripture, levels not to be found elsewhere. Victorine theorizing about these levels is a complicated matter which I can't treat here; all that needs to be said is that the theory is a complex one, that its application is always constrained by what the Church teaches, and that learning to apply it properly is a matter that requires much training. [25]

Victorine readers, then, read with the knowledge and love of God always before them as the point and purpose of their reading. They also have a canonical view of reading, a view that sees the set of things to be read as divided into two basic categories: the canon, the reading of which is essential and primary; and everything else. The canon is deep and inexhaustible; everything else, while useful, is shallow and can be used up. Everything noncanonical (nonscriptural) is to be read in the light of what is canonical. This division, for Victorines, is not a matter of preference on the part of the reader. It is, rather, a matter of what the universe is like; a Victorine reader's universe is configured very differently from either an academic's or a Proustian's. A Victorine's reading also requires the specification of limits on the meaning and use of what is read (whether scriptural or not) as part of the process of instruction in how to read; there is always explicit constraint by authority. Finally, Victorine reading requires the establishment of a set of moral relations between reader and work read. These moral relations make the work read the chief agent, and the reader a subordinate agent, to be conformed to the text. The differences here with both Proustians and academics are deep.

### Reading Choices

The worlds in which our three kinds of readers live and move and do their reading are very different. These differences require some choices. The reading practices of a Proustian are, in fundamental respects, noncompossible with those of both the academic and the Victorine. This is to say that you can't be a serious Proustian reader and a serious Victorine or academic reader. Proustians and academics, for instance, do not share the canonical view of reading advocated by Victorines; neither Victorines nor academics can countenance the Proustian insouciance about the importance of textual particularity and textual memory. This is not to say that there are no commonalities among the three. A Victorine reader preparing for the study of a work of philosophy will do many things that an academic reader will do preparing for the study of the same work (though Proustians will find such technical preparation largely irrelevant); and a Proustian interested in the formation of sensibility by reading will have something in common with a Victorine's interest in the conformity of the reader's mind to God ideally produced by reading. But in spite of these small-scale similarities, the three kinds of reading are, understood as complete programs, quite incompatible one with another.

Realization of this returns us to our beginning. It provides us, theological teachers and learners, with some forced options. The history of academic institutions in the West presses upon those who teach and learn in theological schools at the beginning of the third millennium a particular view of what reading is and is for. It makes one choice about how to read and teach reading-the academic choice-seem natural and obvious. But in fact it is neither. Treating it as if it were is to lose, by default, without the loss fully coming to consciousness, other possibilities. Reading may be a transformative spiritual

discipline. It is so, I think, for both Proustians and Victorines. Reading for Christians must be understood as a transformative spiritual discipline if it is to remain Christian, to be properly articulated with the Christian life. This, in my judgment, should make Christians look again at the history of Christian thought about and practice of reading (of which the Victorine option is an important instance), and in so looking, think again about choices made about how reading is done and taught. If we Christians don't do this, we'll remain subject to decisions about these fundamentally important matters given to us by those who have no interest in or understanding of what Christian formation is. The result will be that the formation of Christian intellectual habits, which is the proper and primary task of a theological school, will remain a task left undone.

## NOTES

[1] Hugh of St. Victor, *Didascalicon*, v.7 ("For the Christian philosopher, reading should be an encouragement, not busy-work; it should nourish good desires, not kill them").

[2] J. Webster, "Reading Theology," *Toronto Journal of Theology* 13/1 (1997), 53-63, at 61. See also his inaugural lecture as Lady Margaret Professor of Divinity at Oxford, *Theological Theology* (Oxford, 1998).

[3] 'Formation' is generally to be preferred to 'education' as a word for what does (or ought) go on in a (Christian) theological school because it emphasizes that Christians are made, not born, and that their Christian-ness must be given them rather than educed (drawn out) from them.

[4] These are the opening lines of Herbert's "The H. Scriptures I", cited from C. A. Patrides, ed., *The English Poems of George Herbert* (London, 1974), 76.

[5] E. Gibbon, *The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*, ed. H. Trevor-Roper (New York, 1993; first pub. 1776-1788), vol.1, 245.

[6] Gibbon, *Decline and Fall*, vol.1, 243.

[7] Max Weber, "Science as a Vocation," in H. H. Gerth & C. Wright Mills, ed. & transl., *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology* (New York, 1946), 129-156. First delivered as a lecture, "Wissenschaft als Beruf," at Munich University, 1918. German in Weber, *Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Wissenschaftslehre* (Tübingen, 1951; 1st ed. 1922), 566-597.

[8] Weber, "Science," 139.

[9] Weber, "Science," 147.

[10] Weber, "Science," 151.

[11] I've used the version of Proust's essay that appeared in the seventh ed. of J. Ruskin, *Sésame et les Lys: Des trésors des rois, des jardins des reines* (Paris, n.d., but probably the 1920s), 7-58. I've consulted the English version by J. Sturrock, in M. Proust, *On Reading* (London, 1994) with profit, but all translations are mine. Sturrock gives further information about the somewhat complicated composition and publishing history of "Sur la lecture."

[12] Proust, "Lecture," 25 n.2.

[13] Proust, "Lecture," 26.

[14] For a very useful discussion of this image in Proust, see Mieke Bal, *The Mottled Screen: Reading Proust Visually* (Stanford, 1997), 13-65.

[15] Proust, "Lecture," 33.

[16] Proust, "Lecture," 35-36.

[17] Proust, "Lecture," 38.

[18] Proust, "Lecture," 50.

[19] I've used T. Offergeld's *Hugo von Sankt Viktor: Studienbuch* (Freiburg, 1997) for the Latin text of Hugh's work, and have consulted J. Taylor's English version found in his *The Didascalicon of Hugh of St. Victor* (New York, 1991). All translations from the *Didascalicon* are my own, and references to it are given by book and chapter (ii.9, e.g.). Both Offergeld and Taylor give much useful information about the *Didascalicon* in general, and about particular points in it, and on this I have frequently and gratefully drawn. I have, in addition, consulted I. Illich's *In the Vineyard of the Text: A Commentary to Hugh's Didascalicon* (Chicago, 1993) with considerable profit.

[20] Hugh, *Didascalicon*, preface.

[21] Hugh, *Didascalicon*, iv.1.

[22] Hugh, *Didascalicon*, iii.13.

[23] Hugh quotes Boethius at some length on this, *Didascalicon*, i.2.

[24] Hugh, *Didascalicon*, v.10.

[25] Hugh distinguishes three levels of meaning and seven hermeneutical principles (*Didascalicon*, v.2, v.4). A detailed analysis of this kind of view may be had from Henri de Lubac's *Medieval Exegesis, volume 1: The Four Senses of Scripture*, transl. Mark Sebanc (Grand Rapids, 1998; the four-volume French original-*Exégèse Médiévale* was

published between 1959 and 1963.